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  Abstract 
 
Purpose - The current study examines the relationship between corporate governance and risk 
management in GCC banks. It aims to contribute to the literature by providing empirical 
evidence from the GCC’s banking industry of the association between risk management and 
corporate governance characteristics such as role duality, board size and percentage of 
nonexecutives. 
Design/Methodology - Using sample of 900 observations from banks in the Gulf countries, non-
parametric regression, Quantile and panel data analysis have been used to test the hypotheses 
and the proposed model. The study uses data from financial institutions in the Gulf countries 
over the period from 2003 till 2012. 
Findings - Findings suggest that role duality and board size are negatively associated with the 
risk management. On other hand the percentage of non-executive members on the board was 
found to be insignificant. Moreover, findings indicate a positive significant relationship between 
governmental ownership and risk management.  
Research Implications - The results suggest that Islamic banks have a positive significant 
association with risk management measured by capital adequacy ratio. The results suggest 
future research to explore the relationship between risk management and other types of 
ownership structure such as institutional ownership. Future research can focus on risk 
management framework and practices in Islamic banks as such banks have its own risk. 
 Keywords: Risk Management, Corporate Governance, Capital Adequacy, Islamic and Conventional Banks, 
GCC Countries 
 
 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Corporate governance is a crucial issue that is being 
addressed widely by regulators and capital market 
participants around the world. The global financial 
crises emphasized the important role of boards of 
directors in managing risk. Theoretically, it can be 
argued that good corporate governance implies good 
risk management. Different corporate governance 
codes indicate that effective risk management is one 
of the main responsibilities of board of directors. 
The issue of corporate governance and risk 
management has received great attention in financial 
institutions. However, while much of the focus in 
corporate governance literature has been on 
corporate governance systems in highly developed 
countries, there has been much less discussion of 
corporate governance institutions in emerging 
capital markets (Mueller, 2006). One of underlying 
questions in this regard is about the appropriateness 
of western concepts and systems; such as codes of 
corporate governance, in developing countries.  
The expression corporate governance carries 
different interpretations and its analysis also 
involves diverse disciplines and approaches (Keasey 
et al., 2005). Corporate governance is the system by 
which business organization are directed and 
controlled. The structure of corporate governance 
identifies the rights and responsibilities of corporate 
participants and specifies the rules and procedures 
for making decisions on corporate affairs. In 
addition, corporate governance ensures that all 
major stakeholders receive reliable information 
about the value of the firm and motivates managers 
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to maximize firm value instead of pursuing personal 
objectives (Luo, 2005). Anand (2005) points out that 
the concept of corporate governance continues to 
expand and suggests that a more appropriate 
definition of corporate governance includes 
additional components such as disclosure of board 
composition, including the number of independent 
directors on the board; composition of various 
committees of the board; and separation of chair of 
the board and CEO.  
It is generally accepted that risk management 
practices need to be supported by good corporate 
governance practices especially in complex 
industries such as banking. Generally, risk 
management is considered as one of the key aspects 
of corporate governance and the ultimate 
responsibility of effective risk management is held 
by the board of directors. Without direct support 
and involvement from the board it is impossible to 
make risk management effective (AbdulRahman et 
al. 2013). The boards of several banks were blamed 
for inefficient risk management practices before and 
during the financial crises (Ingley and Walt, 2008).  
Furthermore, Islamic finance model has some 
features that differentiate it from the traditional 
finance model. Among these features are risk 
sharing and risk pooling. It might be thought that 
such characteristics make the Islamic finance model 
less risky, this thought may be enhanced by the 
evidence from the literature of the superiority of the 
Islamic model during the period of financial crises. 
However, the International Monetary Fund indicates 
that Islamic finance has its own unique set of risks, 
which can be equivalently risky as the conventional 
finance (Cihak and Hesse, 2008). Moreover, using 
some risk management instruments is prohibited in 
Islamic banks due to Shari'ah compliance. This 
suggests that Islamic banks may face more risk as a 
result of such limited ability to deal with risk (Elgari, 
2003). Such unique risks of Islamic finance need 
more research to be well understood. Risk 
management in Islamic banking is still an under-
researched area of study (AbdulRahman et al., 2013)  
Recently the risk management literature in 
financial institutions has been expanded to include 
explanatory factors such as corporate governance 
characteristics and ownership structure. While 
majority of studies in risk management literature 
focus on banks in highly developed countries, less 
discussion of risk management and corporate 
governance institutions has been taken place in 
developing countries. Moreover, Abdul Rahman et al. 
(2013) indicate that there is no empirical study that 
explores the relationship between governance and 
risk management process and the subsequent effect 
on the significance of good governance on the 
effectiveness of risk management practices. The 
current study aims to fill this gap by providing 
empirical evidence of the association between 
corporate governance and risk management in a 
sample of GCC banks over the period from 2003 till 
2012. 
The next section presents the literature review 
and hypotheses development. Section 3 presents the 
research methodology followed by results and 
discussion in sections 4. Conclusion is presented in 
section 5. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
One implication of the increasing attention to 
corporate governance is the growing amount of 
academic research. Recently, an increasing number 
of studies combine two streams of the literature, 
risk management and corporate governance. 
Tandelilin et al. (2007) investigate the relationship 
between corporate governance and both of risk 
management and bank performance. They provide 
evidence of negative relationship between corporate 
governance and risk management. However, they 
report that the relationship between corporate 
governance and risk management is sensitive to type 
of bank ownership. Moreover, bank performance was 
found to be negatively associated with risk 
management.  
In Hong Kong, Christopher and Yung (2009) 
conclude that banks with larger size of board of 
directors and with a lower level of related-party 
loans tend to perform well. The extent of related-
party loans is a key consideration for effective 
corporate governance practices. High levels of 
related-party lending may signal to the market that 
the corporate governance policy of the bank is 
unhealthy. This will adversely affect the reputation 
of the bank and damage its performance. Brian and 
Anna (2014) conclude that there is statistically 
significant relationship between CAR, PTC and 
corporate governance. TA, NPL, ROA are not 
statistically significant relationship between 
corporate governance. There is also statistically 
significant relationship between CAR, PTC and board 
size. TA, NPL and ROA are not statistically 
significant relationship between board sizes. 
Besides, there is showed statistically significant 
relationship between PTC, TA, ROA and board 
meeting. CAR and NPL are not statistically 
significant relationship between board meetings. 
Separation of CEO and the Board Chairman does not 
have a statistically significant effect on the financial 
performance (Durgavanshi, S. 2014). The 
combination between the two positions of chairman 
and executive manager in one person has had a 
positive effect on bank performance; role duality 
may be attributed to the family ownership, which 
characterizes Jordanian banks (Al-Hawary, 2011). 
Hoque and Muradoglu (2013) conclude that there is 
role duality in 49% of the sample and they do not 
find that duality destroys value to the board and the 
duality is not significant for the stock market return 
regressions.  
Kumah et al. (2014) examine the degree to 
which banks in Ghana use risk management 
practices and corporate governance in dealing with 
different types of risk. The result of the study 
indicated that, Board of Directors, senior staffs and 
not all staff are actively involved in risk 
management and the most important types of risk 
facing the sampled banks are credit risk, operating 
risk, solvency risk, interest rate risk, and liquidity 
risk. The study also found out that the sampled 
banks are efficient in managing risk. Cheung (2010) 
concludes that the quality of corporate governance 
appears very significant in explaining future 
company returns and risk. Good corporate 
governance is associated with both higher stock 
returns and with lower unsystematic risk and vice 
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versa. However, Tsorhe et al. (2011) conclude that 
board strength does not have significant impact on 
capital risk, credit risk nor liquidity risk. They report 
that there is no statistical difference between the 
strengths of bank boards in Ghana and that board 
strength does not have significant impact on capital 
risk, credit risk nor liquidity risk. 
Rachdi and Ben Ameur (2011) investigate the 
relationship between board characteristics; 
performance (Return on Assets and Return on 
Equity) and bank risk taking (Z-score) in Tunisian 
banks. They conclude that a small bank board is 
associated with more performance and with more 
bank risk-taking, the presence of independent 
directors within the board of directors affects 
negatively the performance, but has no significant 
effect on the risk-taking, a lower CEO ownership is 
associated with lower performance. Aebi et al. (2011) 
argue that banks have to significantly improve the 
quality and profile of their corporate governance 
and risk management function in order to be well 
prepared to face a financial crisis. Tarraf and 
Majeske (2011) investigate the relationship among 
corporate governance, risk taking and financial 
performance at bank holding companies (BHCs) 
during the financial crisis of 2008. While the paper 
did not find a significant relationship between 
corporate governance and risk-taking level, it shows 
that BHCs with lower risk performed better than 
BHCs with higher risk during the crisis. The results 
suggest that risk taking contributed to the financial 
crisis.  
Ranti and Samuel (2012) report a negative 
relationship between board size and bank financial 
performance in Nigeria. Moreover, larger boards 
were found to be less effective than smaller boards 
because increase in board’s size occurs with increase 
in agency problems.  The authors recommend that a 
smaller board size (6 and 8) for better financial 
performance of banks in Nigeria. Minton et al. (2012) 
indicate that financial expertise among independent 
directors of U.S. banks is positively associated with 
balance sheet and market-based measures of risk. 
While financial expertise is weakly associated with 
better performance before the crisis, it is strongly 
related to lower performance during the crisis. 
Overall, the results are consistent with independent 
directors with financial expertise supporting 
increased risk-taking prior to the crisis.  
Ismail (2012) explores the perceptions and role 
of internal auditors in the audit of risk management 
in Egyptian banks. The study concludes that the 
majority of Egyptian conventional banks are 
employing a framework of risk management to 
identify and manage properly the various risks. 
Moreover, he provides evidence of strong association 
between the type of bank ownership and the quality 
of the risk-based audit procedures; private and joint-
venture banks have higher quality. Internal auditors 
see themselves capable of playing a larger role in the 
audit of risk management framework rather than 
outsourcing experts such as certified public 
accountants. If outsourcing is employed, internal 
auditors prefer an independent risk management 
consulting firm to audit risk management in banks.  
Hassan (2013) uses a sample of 84 Islamic and 
conventional banks from Bangladesh, Bahrain, 
Malaysia Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates, and United Kingdom over the period of 
2006-2009 to investigate the relationship between 
corporate governance and risk-taking. He concludes 
that the corporate governance and financial 
disclosure indices emerged as the key driving forces 
for risk-taking for Islamic banks. AbdulRahman et al. 
(2013) examine the effects of governance on both 
risk management process and risk management 
practices in addition to the impact of risk 
management process on the risk management 
practices of Islamic banks in emerging economies. 
They indicate that banks may lack experience in the 
effective application of risk management. 
Stulz (2014) conclude that the success of risk 
management in performing its functions depends on 
the corporate environment and its ability to shape 
that environment. However, while better risk 
management should lead to better risk taking, there 
is no reason for a bank with good risk management 
to have low risk. Quaresma (2014) analyzes the 
relation between the quality of corporate governance 
practices and the financial performance of 
international listed banks. This research concluded 
that there is a significant relation between best 
corporate governance practices and financial 
performance of studied banks.  
In view of the prior results the current study 
tests for a significant association between corporate 
governance characteristics and risk management. 
Specifically, we test the effect of board 
characteristics; namely board size, role duality, 
percentage of nonexecutives, CEO turnover, gender 
diversity and the existence of audit committee and 
risk committee. In addition we examine the 
association between governmental ownership and 
risk management. The main hypotheses of this study 
are presented below: 
 
H1: There is a significant relationship between 
corporate governance and risk management in the 
GCC banking sector. 
H2: There is a significant relationship between 
governmental ownership and risk management in 
the GCC banking sector. 
 3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The following points show the sample, data 
collection, the model, the definitions and 
measurement of dependent and independent 
variables. 
 3.1. Sample and Data Collection 
 
To test the hypothesis of the current study, we use 
data for all banks in the gulf countries over the 
period from 2003 to 2012. We collect our data from 
the BankScope database and the annual reports of 
selected banks. Originally, 102 banks of GCC 
banking sector have been selected for the study. 
However, we excluded central banks (6 banks) due to 
the unique nature of such banks that differs from 
the nature of other banks. Moreover, 3 banks from 
Bahrain and UAE were excluded due to merger and 
acquisition. The final sample consists of 90 banks 
with 900 observations after excluding 3 more banks 
due to unavailability of required data. To examine 
the association between corporate governance and 
risk management, we employ the following model: 
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RM = β
0
 + β
1
Bsize + β
2
Nexc + β
3
Rdual + β
4
Audcom 
+β
5
Riskcom + β
6
CEOturn + β
7
Gender + β
8
Govown + 
β
9
Banksize + β
10
btype + β
11
Fincris + β
12
ROA + ε 
 3.2. Dependent Variable 
 
The dependent variable in this study is risk 
management (RM). We use Non Performing Loan 
(NPL) as a proxy for risk management. Non-
performing loan ratio (NPL) is a ratio of non-
performing loan to total loans. This ratio reflects the 
managerial risk-taking behavior relative to bank’s 
resources. The higher NPL ratio, the more risk that 
bank takes in its operations and investment. 
Therefore, it is recommended to keep this ratio 
within acceptable level. Some central banks require 
banks to maintain their NPL less than 5%, for 
example Indonesia. NPL is used as a proxy of risk 
management in previous studies, (e.g. Altunbas et 
al., 2000; Tandelilin et al., 2007; and Epure and 
Lafuente, 2012). Following the literature we use NPL 
ratio as a proxy for risk management. Moreover, we 
use Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) as a second proxy 
of our dependent variable; risk management.  
 3.3. Independent Variables 
 
The current study classifies independent variables 
into three categories the first is corporate 
governance characteristics; board leadership, board 
composition and board size. The second is 
ownership structure; governmental ownership. The 
third is bank characteristics as control variables 
which include bank size, bank type: commercial or 
Islamic, profitability and financial crises: before and 
after 2008. Table 1 includes the definition and 
measurement of each independent variable. 
 
Table 1. Definition and measurement of variables 
 
Variable Definition Measurement 
Dependent RM: 
NPL 
CAR 
Non-performing loan 
Capital Adequacy ratio 
Non-performing loan to total loans. 
Independents 
Bsize 
Board size The total number of the members on the board 
Nexc Percentage of non- executives 
Ratio of non-executive directors to the total number of directors on 
the board. 
Rdual Role duality 1 if CEO is the chairman and 0 if otherwise. 
AudCom Audit Committee 1 if there is audit Committee and 0 if otherwise 
RiskCom Risk Committee 1 if there is risk Committee and 0 if otherwise. 
CEOturn CEO turnover 1 if it is the first year of CEO, 0 if otherwise. 
Gender Gender 1 if there is female on the board, and 0 if otherwise 
GovOwn Governmental ownership 1 if government owns more than 50% and 0 if otherwise. 
Banksize Bank size Logarithm of total assets. 
Bank Type Bank type 1 if Islamic bank and 0 if otherwise. 
Finan Cris Financial crisis 1 if before 2008, 0 if otherwise 
Roabp Return on Assets Net income / Total assets 
 4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The current study uses STATA statistical computer 
package to analyze and test the hypotheses. We use 
Longitudinal / panel data analysis to address the 
association between dependent variable; risk 
management, and independent variables; 
characteristics of board of directors and 
governmental ownership.  
 4.1. Descriptive Statistics  
 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the 
independent variables. As indicated in the table, the 
average of board size is 8.69, there is a wide range 
having a minimum and maximum of 3 and 15 
members respectively. The mean of the percentage 
of nonexecutive members on the board is 91%, which 
is high. As indicated in panel B, the mean of role 
duality, as a dummy variable with minimum 0 and 
maximum 1, is 0.04, which means that chairman and 
CEO in 4% of the sample are the same. Moreover, the 
table shows that in 18% of the observations 
governmental ownership is more than 50%. Panel B 
shows that 83% of our sample has audit committee 
and 75% of the sample has risk committee. These 
high percentages can be explained by the nature of 
banking sector as a regulated industry. Furthermore, 
table 2 indicates that 90% of boards of our sample 
are dominated by male which is consistent with the 
culture of gulf countries. 69% of the sample is 
commercial banks while 31% is Islamic banks.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Descriptive for Regression Variables 
 
Variable Mean Min. Max. S.D. Skewness Kurtosis 
Board size 8.693333 3 15 1.955956 -0.17697 3.350372 
Non-executives 0.913889 0.25 1 0.121388 -2.91137 14.55028 
Profitability 0.101067 -1.36 0.7 0.163044 -3.25167 26.31152 
Bank size 8.424833 2.49 12.81 2.311955 -0.18538 2.152578 
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Panel B: Descriptive Statistics of Dummy variables (N=900) 
 
Variable 
 
N % 
Role duality 
1 35 4 
0 865 96 
Audit Committee 
1 747 83 
0 153 17 
Risk committee 
1 678 75 
0 222 25 
CEO turnover 
1 74 8 
0 826 92 
Gender 
1 93 10 
0 807 90 
Governmental ownership 
1 160 18 
0 740 82 
Bank type 
1 280 31 
0 620 69 
Financial Crisis 
1 450 50 
0 450 50 
 
However, the figures in table (2) indicate that 
some variables are skewed which need more 
attention during the analysis process. Before 
running regression analysis we started with 
regression diagnostic using STATA to employ a 
number of graphical and numerical methods. For 
multicollinearity we used correlation coefficients 
and variance inflation factors (VIF) with tolerance 
values. Table (3) provides Pearson correlation 
coefficients between dependent and independent 
variables. In addition, the results of VIF and 
correlations coefficients confirm that there is no 
multicollinearity. Regarding The Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF), Gujarati (2003) indicates there is no 
problem if the VIF is less than 10, others suggest 
that that the value of 5 can be used as a rule of 
thumb (Groebner et al.; 2005). In the current study, 
the maximum VIF is 1.46 and the mean VIF is 1.19. 
Therefore, there is no an unacceptable level of 
multicollinearity in the current study.   4.2. Multivariate Analysis 
 
Using several approaches is recommended to ensure 
that the results are not method driven but are 
robust across methods. To test our model, we run 
three types of regression analysis; pooled OLS, 
Quantile and panel data regression. Robust 
regression analysis such as Quantile regression is an 
example of techniques that focus on minimizing the 
sum of absolute residuals not the sum of squared 
errors as in OLS. Contrary to the classical 
regressions techniques and M estimators that deal 
with variable means, Quantile regression focuses on 
the median. It is more robust against possible 
outliers; skewed tails; and heteroscedasticity 
(Buchinsky and Hahn, 1998; and Koenker and 
Hallock, 2001). The results of the three regressions 
methods are presented in tables (4) and (5). 
As shown in the table (4), there is a negative 
relationship between non-performing loans (NPL) as 
a proxy of risk management and characteristics of 
corporate governance except the existence of audit 
committee and CEO turnover. The three regression 
support that role duality has a significant negative 
relationship with NPL but at different significant 
levels. Furthermore, Table (5) shows that the 
parametric and nonparametric regressions employed 
in the current study support the negative significant 
association between role duality and CAR as a proxy 
of risk management. For the board size, table (4) 
shows that it was negatively significant with NPL at 
10%. However, quantile and panel data didn’t 
support this result. The results in table (4) and (5) 
show that there is no significant relationship 
between the percentage of nonexecutives on board 
and risk management measured by NPL and CAR. 
With regard to audit committee, the results in 
table (4) and (5) show no significant association for 
the existence of audit committees with CAR and 
NPL, except the pooled OLS regression which shows 
that NPL has a positive significant relationship with 
audit committee at 1%. Moreover, table (5) indicates 
that risk committee has negative significant 
association with CAR and NPL at 5% and 10% 
respectively. This result suggests that the existence 
of risk committee helps in reducing NPL and CAR 
and therefore highlights the role and importance of 
such committee in risk management.  There is a 
weak evidence of the association between CEO and 
turnover and the gender variable. Based on the 
above discussion we can accept the first hypothesis 
of association between corporate governance or 
board characteristics and risk management in 
financial institutions in gulf countries. However, 
more research is needed to explore other factors of 
corporate governance.  
With regard to the second hypothesis, the 
results in table (4) provide evidence of a strong 
positive association between the percentage of 
governmental ownership and risk management 
measured by NPL under the three regressions 
employed in the current study. In the same way, 
table (5) provides another evidence of a strong 
positive association between the percentage of 
governmental ownership and risk management 
measured by CAR. These results raise a question of 
the risk management framework and practices in 
CGG banks. Based on our results, we can accept the 
second hypothesis of positive association between 
governmental ownership and risk management.  
Furthermore, the results of table (5) suggest a 
strong positive association between bank type and 
capital adequacy ratio (CAR). Bank type was found to 
have a positive significant association with CAR not 
NPL. This suggests that Islamic banks have capital 
adequacy ratio higher than conventional banks. 
Table (6) summarizes the results of this study. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
The current study investigates the association 
between corporate governance characteristics and 
risk management. Specifically, it focuses on board 
characteristics; namely board size, role duality, 
nonexecutives, CEO turnover, gender, the existence 
of audit committee and risk committee. Moreover, it 
examined the relationship between governmental 
ownership and risk management. Using sample of 
900 observations from banks in The Gulf countries, 
the results provide evidence of negative significant 
association between role duality and risk 
management. The same is for the existence of risk 
committee. However, the results suggest that there 
is no significant relationship between risk 
management and the percentage of nonexecutives 
on the board or CEO turnover. Furthermore, we 
found a positive significant relationship between 
governmental ownership and risk management. The 
results suggest that Islamic banks have a   positive 
significant association with risk management 
measured by capital adequacy ratio. The results and 
the limitation of the current study suggest future 
research to explore the relationship between risk 
management and other types of ownership structure 
such as institutional ownership. Future research can 
focus on risk management framework and practices 
in Islamic banks as such banks have its own risk.  
This study contributes to the corporate 
governance and risk management literature, as it is 
an attempt to fill the gaps in literature in this region 
of the world. In addition, it provides a good evidence 
that the explanatory variables vary among the 
corporate governance and risk management. The 
results of this study can be generalized in different 
regions, especially in countries that have similar 
cultural and regulatory factors. Finally, it provided 
evidence that banks manage their governance and 
risks over time regardless of regulatory changes that 
consequently affect the bank performance. 
The current study has some limitations that 
need to be acknowledged and identified when 
assessing the results of the study. First, the current 
study used a multi-paradigm approach to provide 
descriptive analysis of corporate governance and 
risk management practice. Furthermore, this study 
used mainly quantitative methods in collecting and 
analyzing its data and its main objective is to 
examine the three constructs and discover its key 
determinants. It is mainly classified as a quantitative 
research. The qualitative methods were not adopted 
in the current study because it mainly aims to 
evaluate the extent of corporate governance 
practices to test empirically the association between 
corporate governance and risk management.  
However, using qualitative techniques, such as 
interviews and case studies in addition to the 
quantitative approach may improve our 
understanding to the issue of corporate governance 
and risk management. Second, this study relies on 
secondary data as a main source for collecting its 
data. Primary data may be a useful tool if it is 
accompanied by secondary data. Many attempts 
have been made to use a questionnaire as a 
supported method for collecting the data from the 
banks. However, the response rate is very low. 
Therefore, we decided to depend on secondary data 
only in collecting data for this study. 
In terms of the above limitations, this study 
suggests some areas for future research. First, the 
current study focused on studding the association 
between corporate governance, risk management in 
GCC banking sector for the period from 2003 to 
2012. Future researchers can investigate the same in 
GCC banking sector but after 2012, because we 
expect the management maturity in this sector will 
be enhanced toward the better understanding of 
corporate governance and risk management and 
consequently better performance. Second, in this 
study, we defined some corporate governance 
variables such as board’s committees as a dummy 
variable whereas if the committee is existed takes 
one and zero otherwise. Actually, we decided to use 
these dummy variables by this definition because 
the concept of governance and dedicating 
specialized committees (audit - risk - credit) still new 
and the banks in GCC stared to establish such 
committees in latest years. Future researchers can 
develop the definition of these committees variable 
with more characteristics such as number of 
meeting, qualification of members, member’s 
experience, and member age. Third, future research 
could consider employing different research 
paradigm that can benefit from both quantitative 
and qualitative techniques. Triangulation can add 
more to our understanding to corporate governance 
in general. Fourth, in this study we selected the NPL 
as a measurement of risk management and, we 
suggest that the future researchers can select 
another dependent variable for risk management 
they can test the corporate governance effect on 
liquidity risk, credit risk, or capital risk. 
   REFERENCES 
 
1. Aebi, V.; Sabato, G.; and Schmid, M (2012) “Risk 
Management, Corporate Governance, and Bank 
Performance in the Financial Crisis”, Journal of 
Banking and Finance, Vol. 36, Issue 12, pp. 3213-
3226. 
2. Brian, P. (2014) Corporate Governance and Financial 
Performance of Bank in Asian Regions and 
Recommendations. Asian Journal of Finance & 
Accounting, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2014 
3. Cheung, Y.; Stouritis, A.; and Tan, W. (2010)   “Does 
the Quality of Corporate Governance Affect Firm 
Valuation and Risk? Evidence from a Corporate 
Governance Scorecard in Hong Kong”, International 
Review of Finance, Vol. 10, Issue 4, pp. 403-432. 
4. Christopher and Yung (2009) “The Relationship 
between Corporate Governance and Bank 
Performance in Hong Kong” unpublished thesis, 
Auckland University of Technology, 
aut.researchgateway.ac.nz 
5. Durgavanshi, S. (2014) Impact of Corporate 
Governance Practices on Financial Performance of 
Microfinance Institutions in India. 
http://dl.tufts.edu/catalog/tufts:sd.0000176 
accessed 11 March 2015 
6. Hassan (2013) “Corporate Governance, Risk-Taking 
and Firm Performance of Islamic Banks during 
Global Financial crisis” 
cbagccu.org/files/pdf/3/2.pdf 
7. Hoque, H. & Muradoglu, G. (2013) Bank Boards, CEO 
Characteristics and Performance: Evidence from 
Large Global Banks during the Crisis. 
http://www.busman.qmul.ac.uk/research/Behaviour
al%20Finance%20Working%20Group/132856.pdf 
accessed 12 March 2015 
Corporate Ownership and Control Journal / Volume 13, Issue 3, 2016 
 
 
 16 
8. Groebner, D.; Shannon, P.; Fry, P.; and Smith, K. 
(2005) “Business Statistics – A Decision Making 
Approach”, NJ, Pearson Prentice-Hall 
9. Gujarati, D. (2003), “Basic Econometrics”, Fourth 
Edition, McGraw-Hill. 
10. Kumah, (2014) “Corporate Governance and Risk 
Management in The Banking Sector of Ghana” 
European Journal of Accounting Auditing and 
Finance Research Vol2, No.2, pp.1-17, April, 2014 
11. Minton et al. (2012) “Financial Expertise of the 
Board, Risk Taking, and Performance: Evidence from 
Bank Holding Companies” 
fisher.osu.edu/.../10/.../IER073112_JFQA_fullpaper. 
12. Quaresma (2014), “Corporate Governance Practices 
in Listed Banks-Impact on Risk Management and 
Resulting Financial Performance” Journal of 
Business and Economics, ISSN 2155-7950, USA, 
August 2014, Volume 5, No. 8, pp. 1250-1261 
13. Rachdi, Ben Ameur (2011) “Board Characteristics, 
Performance and Risk Taking Behaviour in Tunisian 
Banks” www.ccsenet.org/ijbm, International Journal 
of Business and Management Vol. 6, No. 6; June 
2011 
14. Ranti, et al. (2012) “The Effects of Board Size on 
Financial Performance of Banks: A Study of Listed 
Banks in Nigeria” URL: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ijef.v4n2p260 
15. Stulz, (2014) “Governance, Risk Management, and 
Risk-Taking in Banks” 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2014/...
/c3 
16. Tandelilin, et al. (2007) “Corporate Governance, Risk 
Management, and Bank Performance: Does Type of 
Ownership Matter?” 
17. Tarraf and Majeske, (2008) “Impact of risk taking on 
bank financial performance during 2008 financial 
crisis” www.aabri.com/manuscripts/131544.pdf 
18. Tsorhe, et al. (2011) “Corporate Governance and 
Bank Risk Management in Ghana” 
www.csae.ox.ac.uk/conferences/2011.../651-
aboagye.p. 
 
